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Red Hat Quay Vulnerability CVE-2026-123710: An Unauthorized Client Can Plant a Trusted Signing Key and Mint Registry Tokens, and Why a Password Reset Will Not Fix It

Red Hat says a flaw in the Quay key server lets an unauthorized client install a signing key that Quay trusts, then create tokens for any repository. Resetting passwords does not remove it. Here is what is confirmed and what to do this week.

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Red Hat Quay Vulnerability CVE-2026-123710: An Unauthorized Client Can Plant a Trusted Signing Key and Mint Registry Tokens, and Why a Password Reset Will Not Fix It
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Red Hat has disclosed a flaw in Red Hat Quay, its container registry. It lets a client with no permission install a signing key that the registry trusts, and then use that key to create its own access tokens. If your business runs Quay, even on an internal network only, you need to deploy the fixed build. Resetting passwords or robot tokens does not remove a key that has already been planted.

What happened with Red Hat Quay CVE-2026-123710

Red Hat describes the issue in one line: "A flaw in the Quay key server lets an unauthorized client install a signing key that Quay trusts." The flaw is tracked as CVE-2026-123710. Red Hat's CVE page credits the finding to its own staff: "This issue was discovered by Dave O'Connor (Red Hat)."

The fix ships in a Red Hat erratum, which Red Hat marks as "Issued 2026-11-11; updated 2026-11-12". Red Hat's knowledge article on the issue has a timestamp of 2026-11-13T10:56:00+00:00, which is 13 November 2026, UTC.

What is confirmed and what is not

Confirmed by Red Hat:

  • An unauthorized client can install a signing key that Quay trusts, through the Quay key server.
  • "Anyone holding a trusted key can create their own tokens and use them on any repository on the registry".
  • "The installed key can be set to never expire, and it survives restarts until someone removes it."
  • "Any Quay instance that untrusted clients can reach is exposed. That includes internal registries."
  • "Deployments where /keys is reachable by untrusted clients are affected."
  • "Resetting passwords or regenerating robot tokens does not revoke an unauthorized signing key." Red Hat's guidance is that a fixed build has to be deployed.
  • The CVSS 3.1 vector Red Hat lists is CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.

Not known from the sources we checked:

  • Whether anyone is exploiting this flaw. Red Hat's text that we checked does not say either way.
  • The exact fixed package versions for each Quay release. Check the Red Hat erratum against the release you run.
  • Whether installing the fixed build also removes a rogue key that was planted before you patched.
  • How to tell from logs whether a rogue key was installed.
  • Whether Quay.io, the hosted service, was affected. The sources discuss Quay deployments and do not mention it.

You may have seen this described as an image signing flaw. Red Hat's text describes a key that is used to create tokens. It says nothing about signatures on container images.

What the CVSS vector means in plain English

We report the vector Red Hat publishes rather than a single score. Taken piece by piece:

  • AV:N: it can be reached over the network.
  • AC:L: the attack is not complicated.
  • PR:N: the attacker does not need a login.
  • UI:N: nobody on your side has to click anything.
  • C:H/I:H/A:H: Red Hat rates the possible impact on confidentiality, integrity and availability as high.

This is the worst possible combination: an attacker who can reach the key server needs no account and no help from your staff.

Why a password reset will not fix the Quay flaw

When a system is breached, the usual first move is to reset passwords and rotate tokens. That does not work here. The attacker does not need your passwords or your robot tokens. Once their own key is trusted, they can make fresh tokens whenever they like. Red Hat says the key can be set never to expire and survives restarts until someone removes it.

That means two jobs: deploy the fixed build, and check which signing keys your registry trusts. We made a similar point in Updated Is Not the Same as Patched: the step that feels like cleanup is not always the step that closes the hole.

Why this matters for a company network

A container registry stores the images your servers, build pipelines and clusters pull and run. Red Hat says a trusted rogue key lets its holder create tokens and use them on any repository on the registry. The sources do not spell out what each token can do. Still, access that reaches every repository should be treated as access to the software your business deploys.

The internal-network point matters too. Many companies host their own registry and assume it is safe because it is not on the public internet. Red Hat says plainly that internal registries are included if untrusted clients can reach them. A contractor laptop, a test machine or any compromised device on the same network could count as an untrusted client.

If you host your own infrastructure, this is the kind of update that needs a named owner. Our self-hosting and infrastructure page and Who Is Patching the Software That Runs Your Business? cover how to set that up.

What to do this week: Red Hat Quay checklist

Step What to do How to check
1 List every Quay instance you run, including internal, test and staging registries Ask whoever runs your containers and build pipelines; check your server and cluster inventory
2 Find out who can reach /keys on each instance Check firewall rules, load balancer routes and network segments in front of Quay
3 Deploy the fixed build Red Hat issued Compare your installed Quay release with the erratum and record the date you deployed it
4 Do not treat a password or robot token reset as the fix Red Hat states this does not revoke an unauthorized signing key
5 After patching, review the signing keys Quay trusts and remove any you did not install Look closely at keys set never to expire. The sources do not say whether the fix removes existing keys, so check rather than assume
6 If a vendor or IT provider runs Quay for you, ask them in writing Ask for the build installed, the date, and the result of the key review

Until the fixed build is in place, limiting which clients can reach /keys reduces the exposure Red Hat describes. Red Hat's text that we checked does not call this a workaround, though, and it would not remove a key that is already there. The fixed build is the fix.

Red Hat Quay vulnerability questions people are asking

What is CVE-2026-123710?

It is a flaw in the Red Hat Quay key server. It lets an unauthorized client install a signing key that Quay trusts, and anyone holding that key can create tokens for any repository on the registry.

Does an attacker need a Quay login?

No. The CVSS vector Red Hat lists includes PR:N, which means no privileges are needed, and UI:N, which means no user interaction is needed.

Is my internal Quay registry safe?

Not automatically. Red Hat says any Quay instance that untrusted clients can reach is exposed, and that includes internal registries.

Will resetting passwords or robot tokens fix it?

No. Red Hat says this does not revoke an unauthorized signing key. You need to deploy a fixed build.

Is CVE-2026-123710 being exploited?

The Red Hat sources we checked do not say. Not knowing is not the same as being safe, so patch anyway.

What is the fixed version of Red Hat Quay?

The fix ships in an erratum Red Hat issued 2026-11-11 and updated 2026-11-12. Check the erratum for the build that matches your release.

Does a rogue key go away after a restart?

No. Red Hat says the installed key survives restarts until someone removes it, and it can be set never to expire.

The bigger lesson

Resetting passwords is the reflex after a scare, but systems also trust keys, and an attacker who plants a key does not need your passwords. Patch the software, then check what it trusts. An internal registry is only as private as the least trusted device that can reach it.

Want someone to own patching and hardening for your servers? See security hardening or get a quote.

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Sources: Red Hat CVE page: CVE-2026-123710; Red Hat knowledge article on the Quay key server flaw; Red Hat erratum on the Quay key server fix.

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